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CALIFORNIA RETAIL LIQUOR DEALERS
ASSOCIATION v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM, INC.:
FEDERAL POWER UNDER THE TWENTY-FIRST
AMENDMENT?
The commerce clause, by its terms, grants Congress the power to
regulate trade among the several states.1 Additionally, the clause places
inherent restrictions on permissible state commercial regulations.2 Sec-
tion 2 of the twenty-first amendment qualifies the commerce clause by
vesting the states with the power to control the transportation or impor-
tation of alcoholic beverages.3 Accordingly, the restrictions the com-
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3. The commerce clause grants Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the In-
dian Tribes." Id.
' Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). If state legislation conflicts with a
federal statute the state regulation must give way to the federal law under the supremacy
clause. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 499, 510 (1956)
(Pennsylvania Sedition Act overturned because directly conflicted with the Smith Act,
which prohibits knowing advocacy of overthrow of U.S. government); Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61, 63, 65 (1954) (state could not suspend carrier's right to use
state's highways in interstate operations when properly licensed by Interstate Commerce
Commission under Federal Motor Carrier Act). See generally Note, Pre-Emption as a
Preferential Ground. A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
Even when Congress has not enacted legislation, the commerce clause places restric-
tions on permissible state regulations. 441 U.S. at 326. A state may legislate in an area
where Congress has not enacted legislation provided that the state law does not place an
undue burden on the free flow of interstate commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 522-23, 530 (1959) (Illinois statute requiring use of certain type of
mudguards on trucks and trailers operating on state highways overturned because regula-
tion placed too heavy burden on interstate commerce); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 350-51, 356 (1951) (city ordinance making it unlawful to sell any milk unless pro-
cessed and bottled in approved plant within five mile radius of city held to place
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763, 783-84 (1945) (state law prohibiting operation of any train with
more than 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars overturned because undue burden on in-
terstate commerce). See generally Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Re-
vised Version, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 547 (1947); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State
Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. "The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating li-
quors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id.
The Supreme Court and most commentators treat § 2, of the XXI amendment in
terms of an affirmative grant of power to the states. See California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's
Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936); The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State
Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1578, 1579 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Authority to Control]; Note, Retail Price Maintenance for Liquor. Does the
Twenty-First Amendment Preclude a Free Trade Market?, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 507,
510 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Price Maintenance]. A minority position asserts that § 2 is a
provision simply allowing the states to exercise their police power over alcohol while the
commodity is still in interstate commerce. See Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v.
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merce clause places on state regulations affecting interstate trade are
modified when the state regulations concern liquor." The Supreme
Court, however, has not determined completely the extent of state con-
trol over alcohol under the twenty-first amendment and, conversely, the
degree of federal authority remaining over alcohol under the commerce
clause.5
All of the Supreme Court's early decisions concerning section 2 of
the twenty-first amendment involved the regulation of importation or
transportation of alcoholic beverages coming into a state "for delivery or
use therein."8 The state regulations, therefore, came directly from the
language of section 2 of the amendment. Despite the direct burden the
state laws placed on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court upheld
state legislation that regulated the importation and sale of liquor.7 The
Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1971); The Concept of State Power Under the
Twenty-First Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REv. 465, 471-73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as State
Power].
' Two competing theories can be gleaned from the Congressional debates over the ef-
fect the XXI amendment was intended to produce on the commerce clause. 76 CONG. REC.
64-4172 (1933); Authority to Control, supra note 3, at 1579-81. The "absolutist" position
states that Congress intended that § 2 of the XXI amendment give plenary power to the
states over alcohol. Id at 1579. The "federalists" assert that Congress intended § 2 to pre-
vent federal restrictions under the commerce clause from unduly interfering with dry states'
regulation of imported intoxicants. Id. at 1580.
' See Authority to Control, supra note 3, at 1578-79; Price Maintenance, supra note 3,
at 509-10. One significant difference between state liquor regulations and other state laws is
that when state regulations of alcohol conflict with a federal statute they are not auto-
matically overturned under the supremacy clause. See note 2 supra. The proposition that
state regulations concerning alcohol have the same status as federal statutes because both
are supported by constitutional provisions is inherent in Supreme Court decisions concern-
ing the XXI amendment. See generally California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109 (1972); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
' Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 395-96 (1939) (state "retaliation"
statute which barred the importation of alcohol from states which restricted importation
from other states sustained); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S.
391, 392 (1939) (same); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 ,402 (1938) (state law
restricting types of liquor that could be imported from other states upheld); State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 229 U.S. 59, 60 (1936) (California statute requiring $500
license fee to import beer sustained); see note 4 supra.
In Young's Mkt, the Court refused to inquire into the XXI amendment's legislative
history stating that "the language of the Amendment is clear." 299 U.S. at 63-64.
' State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936). The Court in
Young's Mkt. upheld a California statute requiring a $500 license fee to import beer into the
state. Id. The Court stated clearly that California's beer importation statute placed an un-
due burden on the free flow of commerce and that prior to adoption of the XXI amendment
the $500 fee would have been impermissible. Id.
Petitioners in Young's Mkt. also claimed that the statute discriminated against whole-
salers who imported beer from other states in violation of the XIV amendment equal protec-
tion clause. Id. at 64; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court summarily dismissed this
claim stating that "[a] classification recognized by the Twenty-First amendment cannot be
deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." 299 U.S. at 64; accord, Mahoney v. Joseph Triner
Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1938).
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Court stated that the broad nature of state authority over alcoholic
beverages logically entailed considerable regulatory power not limited
strictly to importation or sale.' The Court rejected the contention,
however, that section 2 of the amendment released the states from all
restrictions inherent in the commerce clause and other provisions of the
Constitution. When confronted with state regulations over alcohol
which did not come directly from the language of section 2, the Court
began to limit state authority over intoxicating beverages. The limita-
tions the Court placed on state authority over alcohol were in areas of
exclusive federal concern, such as federally owned installations," regula-
tion of commerce with foreign nations," and taxation of imports from
' Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). The Court upheld Kentucky's com-
plex system for licensing liquor haulers only after concluding that the laws were a
reasonable exercise of the state's authority over alcoholic beverages. Id. Since a state could
absolutely prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation or possession of liquor, the Court
reasoned that a state could adopt measures "reasonably appropriate to effectuate these in-
hibitions." Id.
" State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936); see note 6
supra. In Young's Mkt., petitoners contended that to sustain California's beer importation
statute would require an interpretation that the XXI amendment freed the states from all
restrictions placed on their power over alcohol found in the Constitution. Id. The Court
stated that such a generalization was not required. Id.; e.g. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320
(1967) (per curiam); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
The effect of the XXI amendment on other constitutional provisions is increasingly
doubtful. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976). When the exercise of state's power over
alcohol contravened the XIV amendment's due process and equal protection rights, the
Supreme Court limited that power. See id. (statutory scheme prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer
to males under 21 years and females under 18 years overturned because constituted
discrimination in violation of equal protection clause of XIV amendment); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 165 (1973) (state liquor licensing program violated XIV amend-
ment to extent it operated to allow Moose Lodge to practice racial discrimination); Wiscon-
sin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434 & 439 (1971) (state law authorizing posting of the
names in retail liquor stores of persons to whom liquor was not to be sold invalidated
because contravened XIV amendment due process requirements). But see California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110 & 119 (1972) (California's law prohibiting explicit sexual live enter-
tainment and films in bars and other establishments licensed to sell liquor by the drink sus-
tained against I and XIV amendment challenges); note 7 supra. See generally Authority to
Control, supra note 3, at 1595-1610; Price Maintenance, supra note 3, at 521-25; see also note
13 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 11-13 infra. See generally Authority to Control, supra
note 3, at 1582-95; Price Maintenance, supra note 3, at 515-20.
" See United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 368 (1973) (XXI amendment
did not give states power to control or tax importation of liquor into federal military bases
under exclusive jurisdiction of United States); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304
U.S. 518, 538-39 (1938) (XXI amendment did not give states power to regulate importation of
liquor going exclusively into national park under jurisdiction of United States).
" Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 334 (1964); accord,
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control for Cal. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 378 U.S. 124,
124 (1964) (per curiam). In Idlewild, the Court concluded that the XXI amendment did not
grant the states power over foreign commerce in alcohol, reasoning that foreign liquor
[Vol. XXXVIII
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foreign countries.13
Recent cases have sharpened the contours of state and federal
regulatory authority over alcohol." California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.15 represents the Supreme Court's
most recent attempt to define the relationship between states' power
under the twenty-first amendment and federal power under the com-
merce clause. Midcal reaffirmed that the federal government still re-
tains an interest in the control of alcoholic beverages in interstate com-
merce.16 Furthermore, the Court established that when a conflict arises
between a state alcohol regulation and a valid exercise of the federal
commerce power that the respective interests must be closely evaluated
and balanced to properly resolve the conflict. 7
The controversy in Midcal arose from the petitioner's violation of
California's wine pricing laws enacted pursuant to the State's power
under section 2 of the twenty-first amendment."8 California's wholesale
wine pricing laws required that all wine producers, wholesalers and recti-
fiers file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. 9 The con-
tracts or price schedules set the terms for all wholesale transactions in a
particular brand of wine within a given trading area."0 In July 1978, the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., a wholesale distributor of wine in Southern California,
with the sale of twenty-seven cases of wine below the price set by the ef-
fective price schedule of the E&J Gallo Winery.
21
shipments did not constitute importation or transportation within the meaning of section 2.
377 U.S. at 325-26; see note 11 supra.
11 Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 346 (1964)
(XXI amendment does not give states power to tax alcohol imported from abroad in viola-
tion of export-import clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2); William Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939) (per curiam) (states lack exclusive power to regulate
imported alcohol under XXI amendment).
1 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-08 (1976); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 114-15 & 118 (1972); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
329-33 (1964); see notes 9 & 12 supra.
's 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
M IL at 110.
2 Id at 109-10.
', Id at 100.
10 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964). Under the California law, if no fair
trade contract were entered into, then a schedule of selling prices of wine was posted. Id.
1 445 U.S. at 99. The State was divided into three trading areas for administration of
the wine pricing program. A single fair trade contract or schedule for each brand established
the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area. CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1980). Similarly, state regulations provided
that a single wholesaler posted wine prices within a trading area which bound all
wholesalers in that area. Ikidcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979,983-84,153 Cal.
Rptr. 747,762 (1979). The State, however, had no direct control over the wine prices, and did
not review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers. 445 U.S. at 100.
21 445 U.S. at 100. The Department alleged that Midcal sold wine for which no fair
trade contract or schedule had been filed. Id. No state-licensed wine merchant could sell
1981]
306 WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
Mideal stipulated that the allegations were true and filed a writ of
mandate in the California Court of Appeals, requesting an injunction
against the state's wine pricing system.' Midcal asserted that
California's wine pricing system illegally restrained trade in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act (the Act).3 The Department contended,
however, that the twenty-first amendment precluded application of the
Act.24 Relying exclusively on the reasoning utilized in an earlier Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision, the California Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Midcal, holding that the wine pricing system violated the Sher-
man Act.
25
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the California
Court of Appeals' decision.2 8 Having determined that California's wine
wine to a retailer at a price lower than the state set upon penalty of fine, license suspension,
or license revocation. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 24862 & 24880 (West Supp. 1979).
Licensees that sold wine below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or schedules could
have been subject to private damage suits for unfair competition. Id. § 24752.
1 445 U.S. at 100; Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 981, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 757, 759 (1979). Mandate is an appropriate writ for court review of a constitutionally
authorized statewide agency's exercise of quasi-judicial power. Id. at 981, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
759.
, Id. at 980-81, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 758-59. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), pro-
vides that the restraint of interstate trade or commerce is illegal. Id. § 1(a). See generally
Price Maintenance, supra note 3, at 528-29; W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
AMERICA 54-70 (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); see also text ac-
companying note 30 infra.
24 Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760
(1979).
The Department argued that the state laws were immune from anti-trust prosecution
under the Sherman Act. Id. at 982-83, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 759-60; see text accompanying note
28 infra.
1 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757. The court in Midcal relied on the California
Supreme Court case of Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476,
146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978). The California Supreme Court in Rice employed a balancing test in
determining that the policies underlying the Sherman Act clearly outweighed those behind
California's liquor price maintenance system. Id. at 451-58, 579 P.2d at 490-94, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 599-603. In Rice the California Supreme Court invalidated California's liquor minimum
pricing scheme as a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 459,579 P.2d at 494-95,146 Cal. Rptr.
at 603-04. The court rejected the argument that the liquor pricing scheme was protected
from anti-trust prosecution by either the "state action" doctrine or the XXI amendment. Id
The California Court of Appeals in Midcal held that the challenged wine price maintenance
laws were not significantly different from the statutes found to be invalid in Rice. 90 Cal.
App. 3d at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
" 445 U.S. at 102. The California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control did not
appeal the Court of Appeals decision, rather an intervenor, California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association, brought the appeal. Id at 101-02. Although the California Supreme Court
denied a hearing of the case, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.
Id.; 444 U.S. 824 (1979).
The Department did not seek certiorari from the Supreme Court following the Rice
decision, nor did they appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1979). In Capiscean Corp., the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals employed the analysis used in Rice to invalidate California's resale
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pricing system violated the Sherman Act,' the Court addressed the De-
partment's contention that section 2 of the twenty-first amendment pre-
cluded application of the Act.' The Court stated that a careful examina-
tion of the interests underlying the Sherman Act and California's regula-
tions was essential to the resolution of the conflict between the two
laws." Congress enacted the antitrust laws to enforce the firmly es-
price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to consumers. 445 U.S. at 102 n.4.
The Court in Midcal made note of the unusual posture of the Midcal case and the
Department's failure to appeal the prior cases. Id. at 111 n.12. The Court stated that the
State of California had shown "less than an enthusiastic interest" in its wine pricing system.
Id.
, 445 U.S. at 103. The Court found that California's wholesale wine pricing system
constituted resale price maintenance, reasoning that wine producers held the power to pre-
vent price competition by dictating the prices charged by wholesalers. Id. Prior cases have
held consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains trade. See Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
45-47 (1960). Moreover, the Sherman Act applies to fair. trade contracts. 445 U.S. at 102-03.
Relying on Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) and
Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam), the Court rejected the argument that
California's program was simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
445 U.S. at 103; see note 54 infra.
1 445 U.S. at 106. The Court in Midcal rejected the Department's argument that
California's wine pricing system was a protected "state action." Id. at 105-06. In Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court found that the Sherman Act was not enacted to nullify
state powers. Id. at 352. The Parker v. Brown "state action" exemption provides that a
state is exempt from prosecution when it acts through its legitimate state agencies or of-
ficers pursuant to legislative authority. Id. at 351-52. See generally Price Maintenance,
supra note 3, at 530-33; Note, State Action Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 B.U.L.
REV. 393, 400-05 (1971). Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. See, e.g.,
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); City of Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). The
Court in Midcal concluded that the recent decisions applying the Parker analysis established
two standards for antitrust immunity. 445 U.S. at 105. First, the activity in question must
be "'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"' and second,'the
state must actively supervise the policy. Id. See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Court in Midcal found that California's wine price maintenance system satisfied
the first requirement of the Parker analysis. 445 U.S. at 105. The Court found, however,
that the California regulations did not fulfill the second requirement under the Parker test.
Id. California simply authorized the price-setting and enforced the prices established by
private parties. Id. The State was not involved in any other aspect of the program. Id. The
Court reasoned that the result of California's regulations was to permit private price fixing
arrangements and therefore the regulations were not immune from Sherman Act prosecu-
tion. Id. at 106. See generally Note, Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board: The
Demise of Fair Trade in California, 3 GLENDALE L. REV. 105 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as
Demise of Fair Trade].
In Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., No. 80-1047 (8th Cir. Aug. 25, 1980), the
Eighth Circuit referred to the Midcal enunciation of the Parker "state action doctrine" as a
"recent articulation." Id. slip op. at 15. The Tenth Circuit, however, apparently considered
the test enunciated in Midcal as a modification of that set forth in prior Parker type cases.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980).
445 U.S. at 110. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964)
was the first case in which the Court articulated the need to balance the commerce clause
1981]
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tablished national policy in favor of competition and free enterprise.
The Court identified the state's interests attributed to California's wine
pricing system as the promotion of temperance and orderly market con-
ditions. Neither state interest enjoyed much support. A California state
government study indicated that the wine pricing laws did not promote
temperance.2 Congressional studies revealed that price maintenance
laws did not aid orderly market conditions and that the laws were not
necessary for the survival of small retail businesses. In conclusion, the
and the XXI amendment. Id. at 332. In Idlewild, the Court emphasized that both provisions
were part of the same Constitution and therefore "each must be considered in light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case." Id. at
331-32; see Price Maintenance, supra note 3, at 516-18. See generally Note, The Evolving
Scope of State Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 759 (1965). In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35
(1966), the Court indicated that a balancing approach should be employed to resolve conflict-
ing federal and state interests over alcoholic beverages. Id. at 42-44; see Price Maintenance,
supra note 3, at 520; State Power, supra note 3, at 482-83. The Court later intimated that
the balancing analysis should be limited to cases involving a conflict between the commerce
clause and state liquor regulations. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976). See also
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
445 U.S. at 110-11. Relying on United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)
and Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court stated that the
Sherman Act was the "Magna Carta of free enterprise." 445 U.S. at 110-11. The Court fur-
ther analogized the importance of the Sherman Act to "the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system," to the importance of the Bill of Rights as the pro-
tectorate of fundamental personal freedoms. Id. The Court also emphasized the fact that
Congress utilized all the power it possessed under the commerce clause to enact the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 111.
31 445 U.S. at 111-13. The Court adopted the state's interest in California's laws as
identified by the California Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court. Id.; see
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 76; note 25 supra.
The Supreme Court also adopted the California courts' interpretation and evaluation of the
State's interests behind the wine pricing regulations. 445 U.S. at 112-14. The Court stated
that there was no basis to disagree with the California courts' evaluation of the asserted
state interests. Id. at 113.
" 445 U.S. at 112. To support the proposition that the price-fixing system did not pro-
mote temperance, the California courts relied on a state study showing a 42% increase in
per capita liquor consumption in California from 1950 to 1972, years during which resale
price maintenance was in effect. Id.; see California Dept. of Finance, Alcohol and State: A
Reappraisal of California's Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). The California court
stated that the study, at the very least, raised a doubt whether the laws could be justified
as promoting temperance. 445 U.S. at 112. See also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,39 (1966) (citing study concluding that resale price maintenance in New
York State had no significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages).
445 U.S. at 113. A Congressional study showed that states with fair trade laws had
at 55%h higher rate of firm failure than free trade states. Additionally, the rate of growth of
small retail stores in free trade states betwen 1956 and 1972 was 32% higher than in states
with fair trade laws. S. REP. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975), reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 1569, 1571. The California courts also looked to congres-
sional abandonment of fair trade in 1975 with the Consumer Goods Pricing Act as indicative
of the lack of justification for continuing fair trade practices with respect to wholesale wine
trade. 445 U.S. -at 113.
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Supreme Court determined that the state's interests underlying the
California wine pricing laws were "not of the same stature" as those of
the Sherman Act. 4 Consequently, the twenty-first amendment did not
preclude the application of the Sherman Act to California's regu-
lations. 5 The Court held that the state laws were invalid because they
violated the Act."
The Supreme Court in Midcal reaffirmed that the federal govern-
ment retains an interest in the regulation of alcoholic beverages through
its commerce power3 Although the Court did not explicitly define the
parameters of the remaining federal interest, the Court did provide
some guidance for lower courts. In Midcal, the Court drew a distinction
between state regulations that involve importation, sale or distribution
of liquor and regulations that govern peripheral aspects of liquor con-
trol. 8 According to the Court in Midcal, the commerce clause permits
the federal government to regulate peripheral aspects of liquor control
in appropriate situations. 9
A corollary to the Court's holding that the federal government
possesses an interest in the peripheral aspects of liquor regulation is
that no commerce clause authority exists over the importation, sale or
distribution of alcohol."0 The Court, however, qualified state authority in
445 U.S. at 114.
35 1d.
I Id. The Court in Midcal reaffirmed the Court's earlier refusal to inquire into the
legislative history of the XXI amendment when interpreting the effect of the Amendment.
445 U.S. at 106-07; see note 6 supra. The Court emphasized the Amendment's ambiguous
legislative history and the states' indecisiveness in the ratification conventions in determin-
ing the effect of § 2. 445 U.S. at 107 n.10. See generally E. BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION (1938).
445 U.S. at 110.
Id. The distinction between state regulation of importation, sale or distributing of li-
quor and peripheral liquor regulations was indicated first in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S.
132 (1939). The Court distinguished between regulations concerning "manufacture,
transportation, sale or possession" and other regulations adopted to effectuate limitations
on alcohol traffic. Id. at 138. In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 337 U.S. 324
(1964) the Court specifically included distribution of liquor in the same category with impor-
tation or sale. Id at 330. This distinction follows logically from the language of § 2 of the
XXI amendment. The Amendment's terms refer to "transportation or importation" into a
state "for delivery or use therein." See note 3 supra. The decision whether to allow the im-
portation of alcoholic beverages into a state, necessarily involves the decision whether to
allow the sale of intoxicants in the state. Similarly, an affirmative conclusion to allow the im-
portation and sale of alcohol in a state logically involves decisions concerning the manner of
distribution. See Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, -, 166 Cal. Rptr.
563, 571 (1980).
445 U.S. at 110.
The California Court of Appeals case of Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App.
3d 348, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1980), decided since Midcal, supports the proposition that the
federal government does not retain commerce clause authority over the importation, sale or
distribution of alcohol. Id. at -, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 571. In holding a state liquor regulation
invalid as a violation of the Sherman Act, the California court relied on the analysis
employed in Midcal and Rice v. Alcoholic Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 146, Cal. Rptr.
585, 579 P.2d 476 (1978). 108 Cal. App. 3d at -, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 570-73. One of the con-
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the importation, sale or distribution of alcohol. The Court stated that the
twenty-first amendment grants "virtually complete control" to the
states over importation, sale or distribution of liquor, as opposed to com-
plete control over this aspect.4 Although the Supreme Court could have
meant that the federal government retains some commerce clause au-
thority over importation, sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages,
Supreme Court precedent does not support this interpretation." Prior
Court treatment of the twenty-first amendment power supports the
proposition that by employing the word "virtually," the Court was refer-
ring to limitations of constitutional provisions other than the commerce
clause. 3 Prior case law also supports the view that the Court in Midcal
was referring to the limitations placed on state authority in areas of ex-
clusive federal concern."
If the federal government does not retain commerce clause authority
over the importation, sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages, a con-
flict between federal power and a state regulation restricted to the impor-
tation, sale or distribution of liquor could never arise. If the exercise of
the federal commerce power over a peripheral aspect of liquor regula-
tion conflicts with a state statute, however, Midcal established that-
courts should use a balancing process to resolve the conflict. 8 Courts
tentions the court addressed was whether the regulation in question concerned the importa-
tion, sale or distribution of alcohol. Id. at - , 166 Cal. Rptr. at 571. The court determined
that the statute in question did not relate to importation, sale or distribution. Id. The court
stated that these regulations were precisely the type "which must be reconciled with the
federal interests in interstate commerce." Id.; see note 5 supra.
445 U.S. at 110.
See Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939);
Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939). The Supreme Court held that
the states' right to prohibit or regulate importation of alcoholic beverages was not limited
by the commerce clause. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. at
394; Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. at 398; see text accompanying notes 6 & 7
supra. In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964), the Court
reiterated their prior position that granted absolute control to the states over importation
of liquor. Id. at 330. The Court also stated that states' power to restrict, regulate or prevent
the traffic and distribution of intoxicants within its borders had remained unquestioned. Id.
See text accompanying notes 8 & 13 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra. The Court in Midcal briefly reviewed the
case history of the XXI amendment. 445 U.S. at 107-10; see text accompanying note 45 infra.
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court indicate that these prior cases were modified by the
Midcal opinion. The Court has not hesitated to modify the holding of a prior XXI amend-
ment case when it determined that the case was no longer a correct interpretation of states'
authority under the Amendment. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra & 46-48 infra.
" 445 U.S. at 110; accord, Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, -'
166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 571 (1980); Goldstein v. Miller, 488 F. Supp. 156, 174 (D. Md. 1980); see
note 29 supra. Although the Court in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377
U.S. 324, 332 (1964) indicated that a balancing process should be used to resolve a conflict
between the commerce clause and the XXI amendment, at least one commentator sug-
gested that the balancing approach was particular to the facts of Idlewild. Authority to
Control, supra note 3, at 1594.
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should examine the state liquor regulations closely to identify state
policies serves by the statute in question and to determine whether the
regulations vindicate the state policies.' The Court in Midcal also stated
that courts should evaluate the federal policy underlying the conflicting
federal power and determine the importance of the policy. 8 After defin-
ing the degree of interference the state regulation imposes on interstate
commerce, a court should weigh the state's interest against the federal
interest.49
The Midcal decision raises an important question for lower courts of
how to determine whether a regulation concerns the importation, sale or
distribution of liquor or a peripheral aspect of liquor control. A statute
requiring a licensing fee for the right to bring liquor into a state is
directly related to importation.' Conversely, state regulation of liquor
47 445 U.S. 111-14; Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, - , 166 Cal.
Rptr. 563, 571 (1980). If state regulations related to importation, sale or distribution are sub-
ject to commerce clause authority, then an important factor in the balancing process is
whether the state regulation in question concerns these aspects of liquor regulation. See.
text accompanying notes 43-46 supra & 48 infra. State regulations falling within the wor-
ding of § 2 of the XXI amendment would carry a greater presumption of validity than
peripheral regulations. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976); Price Maintenance,
supra note 3, at 525.
Courts may encounter the practical problem of attempting to determine state interests
behind liquor regulations. Many states have little or no legislative history for their laws.
The difficulty in determining state interests may explain in part the Midcal Court's com-
plete acceptance of the California court's evaluation of the state interest behind the wine
price maintenance scheme. See note 36 supra.
In Norman Williams, the California court stated that a factor relevant to whether the
regulation in question vindicates the state policies it reflects, is whether the state interest
can be fulfilled by an alternative means which would not conflict with federal interests. 108
Cal. App. 3d at -, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
445 U.S. at 110-11.
'9 Id.; Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, - , 166 Cal. Rptr. 536,
571 (1980).
The balancing approach utilized by the Court in Midcal resembles closely that which
the Court has employed in "negative commerce clause" cases. Negative commerce clause
cases are cases involving state regulations which burden interstate commerce within an
area in which Congress has not acted or has enacted federal regulations which do not
preempt state regulations. See text accompanying note 2 supra. In such cases, the Court
has considered whether the laws in question achieve their stated objective and whether the
regulation in question is essential for the protection of the state interest. See Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,
325 U.S. 761, 779 (1945). The Court also considered whether there was an alternative means
to achieve the state interests in negative commerce clause cases. See Great AtI. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 373 (1976); Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. The XXI amend-
ment, however, gives additional weight to the validity of state liquor regulations. See
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
' See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 60 (1936) (California
statute requiring $500 license fee to import beer sustained). See also text accompanying
note 6 supra. But see Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 168 Cal. App. 3d 348, -, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 563, 566 (1980) (Sherman Act held applicable to state regulation concerning designa-
tion of authorized importers by distilled spirits brand owners or agents).
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advertisements does not directly relate to importation, sale or distribu-
tion. 1 Yet arguably advertising does indirectly relate to the sale of li-
quor, as the very purpose of alcohol advertising is to influence people to
purchase liquor. Conceivably there are liquor regulations which courts
will find very difficult to place in one category or another. As Midcal in-
dicates, the Supreme Court apparently considers the pricing of alcoholic
beverages peripheral to the importation, sale or distribution of liquor.2
Regulations concerning the pricing of alcoholic beverages are not
related to a state's decision of whether to permit the importation or sale
of liquor.' Price setting does not directly affect the structure of the li-
quor distribution system of a state." The pricing of alcoholic beverages,
however, does effect the sale of liquor indirectly, because it determines
the consumer cost for alcohol. Arguably, the Supreme Court requires a
state regulation to directly relate to importation, sale or distribution of
liquor in order that the regulation fall within this category.
After Midcal, lower courts may also be confronted with the question
of whether any state interest in the peripheral control of alcoholic
beverages can withstand a valid exercise of the federal commerce
power. Regulations not directly related to the importation, sale or distri-
bution of alcohol appear to be more susceptible to overriding federal in-
terest now than before Midcal.55 The Court did not have the opportunity
51 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
See 445 U.S. at 99-100. The Court in Midcal never explicitly stated that pricing
regulations were peripheral aspects of liquor control. The fact that the Court never discussed
the California pricing schemes' relationship to the importation, sale or distribution of
alcoholic beverages indicates that the Court did not consider pricing of alcohol to be directly
related to these enumerated areas. In contrast, the California court in Norman Williams
Co. v. Rice, 168 Cal. App. 3d 348,-, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 571 (1980) considered the question
of whether a challenged liquor regulation was directly related to importation, sale or
distribution, vital to their analysis. See note 40 supra.
'Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, -, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 571
(1980).
l.
See Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Simon, 48 U.S.L.W. 3746, 3746 (1980); Colby Distrib.
Co. v. Lennen, 227 Kan. 2d 179, -, 606 P.2d 102, 110 (1980); William J. Mezzetti Assocs.
v. State Liquor Auth., 51 N.Y.2d 761, 761, 411 N.E.2d 791, 791, 432 N.Y.S.2d 372, 372 (1980)
(per curiam).
The change in attitude of lower courts toward peripheral regulations since Midcal sup-
ports the proposition that Midcal lessens the presumption of validity that state liquor
regulations enjoyed previously from the XXI amendment. For example, prior to Midcal, the
Kansas Supreme Court in Colby Distrib. Co. rejected a challenge, based on the California
decisions in Rice and Midcal, against their price maintenance system. 227 Kan. 2d at -,
606 P.2d at 110. In February 1980 the New York Court of Appeals upheld their state's liquor
pricing system. William J. Mezzetti Assocs. v. State Liquor Auth., 49 N.Y.2d 758, 758, 403
N.E.2d 184, 184, 426 N.Y.S.2d 479, 479 (1980) (per curiam). Following the Supreme Court's
decision in Midcal, however, the New York court reversed its previous ruling and held their
liquor pricing system invalid because it violated the Sherman Act. William J. Mezzetti
Assocs. v. State Liquor Auth., 51 N.Y.2d 761, 761, 411 N.E.2d 791, 791, 432 N.Y.S.2d 372,
372, rev'g per curiam, 49 N.Y.2d 758, 403 N.E.2d 184, 426 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1980) (per curiam).
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to balance legitimate state interests against federal interests in in-
terstate commerce, because the state regulations in Midcal were totally
unsupported.5 Midcal should not be interpreted, however, as overturn-
ing any peripheral state regulation of alcoholic beverages which conflicts
with a federal interest. The Court stated that only in "appropriate situa-
tions" would a federal interest override a conflicting state interest in
alcohol regulation. The Court advanced the balancing process as a means
to determine when an appropriate situation exists.17 If a price-
maintenance scheme for the sale of alcoholic beverages structured
similarly to California's is challenged under the Sherman Act, the courts
will probably overturn the statute unless a state can prove a viable in-
terest which supports the regulation.8 It remains to be seen, however,
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded a Fifth Circuit case decided before Midcal for
consideration in light of Midcal. Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Simon, 48 U.S.L.W. 3746, 3746
(1980).
Recent lower court cases indicate other areas in which the federal government may re-
tain an interest in the control of alcohol. See Castlewood Int'l Corp., 596 F.2d 638, 640 (5th
Cir. 1979); Goldstein v. Miller, 488 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Md. 1980); Norman Williams Co. v.
Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, -, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563, 566 (1980). See also William Jameson &
Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172 (1939) (per curiam). The Sherman Act was held ap-
plicable to a state statute concerning the designation of authorized importers by distilled
spirits brand owners or agents. Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d at -, 166
Cal. Rptr. at 566. In addition to the Sherman Act, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
(FAA Act) and'regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) enacted
pursuant to the FAA Act reflect federal interest in the control of alcohol. 27 U.S.C. §§
201-212 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979); see Castlewood Int'l Corp., 596 F.2d at 640; Goldstein v.
Miller, 488 F. Supp. at 158. See also William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. at 172.
The FAA Act deals primarily with the licensing of wholesalers and manufacturers of distill-
ed spirits and the prevention of unfair competition and unlawful practices in the liquor in-
dustry. 27 U.S.C. §§ 203-205 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979). In promulgating the FAA Act, Con-
gress relied partially on its commerce clause power, but much of the FAA Act is supported
by Congress' taxing power. Goldstein v. Miller, 488 F. Supp. at 162. The FAA Act was held
not unconstitutional against a challenge that the XXI amendment transferred complete and
exclusive control over alcohol to the States. Arrow Distillers, Inc. v. Alexander, 109 F.2d
397, 400-01 (7th Cir.), cert denied 310 U.S. 646 (1940).
' See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. California's wine pricing system did not
vindicate the state interests the legislature extended to protect by enactment of the
system. 445 U.S. at 111-14. Conversely, the federal interests expressed by the Sherman Act
are well supported and established. Id. at 110-11; see text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
The Court in Midcal did not discuss the burden which California's wine price maintenance
system placed on interstate commerce. Instead, the Court relied on the burden which fair
trade contracts in general place on commerce. 445 U.S. at 103.
, 445 U.S. at 110. The Court did not attempt to define what an "appropriate situation"
was for the application of the federal commerce power to peripheral regulations of alcohol.
Rather, the Court provided the balancing process to determine from the circumstances of a
particular case when an appropriate situation existed. See text accompanying notes 46-49
supra.
I At the time Midcal was decided 13 states had price maintenance schemes for liquor
in effect which were similar to California's. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, App. F. Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). New Jersey
previously revised their price-maintenance laws based on the earlier California courts' deci-
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whether under the Midcal balancing approach other peripheral regula-
tions of alcoholic beverages, supported by viable state concerns, can
withstand a challenge based on a conflict with a federal statute.
CAROLINE WANNAMAKER
sions in Rice and Midcal. Heir v. Degnan, 82 N.J. 109, -, 411 A.2d 194, 198 (1980). The
New York Court of Appeals, relying on Midcal, recently held the New York liquor price
maintenance system invalid. William J. Mezzetti Assocs. v. State Liquor Auth., 51 N.Y.2d
761, 761, 411 N.E.2d 791, 791, 432 N.Y.S.2d 372, 372 rev'g per curiam, 49 N.Y.2d 758, 403
N.E.2d 184, 426 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1980) (per curiam).
A price maintenance system for liquor that provides for active state supervision and
control, is exempt from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
See note 28 supra; Demise of Fair Trade, supra note 28, at 118. The Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board recently concluded that their state's liquor fair trade laws were not
invalidated by the Supreme Court decision in Midcal. In re Taylor Drug Stores, Inc., [1981]
995 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Ky. ABC Bd., Dec. 18, 1980). The Board found
the price maintenance system exempt from Sherman Act prosecution under the Parker
"state action" doctrine. Id. The Court in Midcal pointed out that state liquor monopolies
would be immune from Sherman Act prosecution under Parker v. Brown. 445 U.S. at 106
n.9, citing VA. CODE §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Repl. Vol. 1979). In dictum, the Court in Young's Mkt.
stated that a state could establish a monopoly over manufacture and sale of alcohol under
their XXI amendment powers. State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62
(1936). California is presently considering a bill which provides that liquor cannot be sold for
a price less than the wholesale cost plus a 6% markup. The State will set the minimum
prices. Assembly Bill 935; Demise of Fair Trade, supra note 28, at 118.
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